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INTRODUCTION

On March 15, 2019, Brenton Tarrant, a twenty-eight-year-old
white male, posted a livestream video on Facebook just moments
before opening fire on members of the Al Noor Mosque in
Christchurch, New Zealand.1 Tarrant took the lives of forty-one
individuals before proceeding to the Linwood Islamic Centre to carry
out his violent plan to kill Muslims.2 Fifty-one lives were lost that
day at the hands of a terrorist in the name of white supremacy.3 In
addition to broadcasting his attack worldwide, Tarrant posted a
sixteen-thousand-word manifesto to a popular hate-filled forum—
8chan.4 Tarrant exploited various avenues of social media to draw
attention to his cause, which played out exactly as he had hoped.5
The terrorist attack in New Zealand sparked a series of attacks in the
U.S. in the name of white supremacy;6 the deadliest was the shooting
in El Paso, Texas.7 On August 3, 2019, Patrick Crusius, a twentyone-year-old white male, opened fire at a Walmart shopping center in

*

1.

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

J.D. Candidate, May 2021, University of Baltimore School of Law, Business Law
Concentration; B.A., Political Science, Philosophy, May 2017, University of North
Carolina at Charlotte. I would like to thank Professor Colin Starger for his support
and guidance throughout the research process. A special thank you to the University
of Baltimore Law Review staff for their hard work and dedication to this Issue.
Christchurch Shooting Live Updates: 49 Are Dead After 2 Mosques Are Hit, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/world/asia/new-zeala
nd-shooting-updates-christchurch.html [https://perma.cc/FY3J-923N] [hereinafter
Christchurch Shooting].
See SOUFAN CTR., WHITE SUPREMACY EXTREMISM: THE TRANSNATIONAL RISE OF THE
VIOLENT WHITE SUPREMACIST MOVEMENT 6 (2019), https://thesoufancenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/Report-by-The-Soufan-Center-White-Supremacy-Extremism
-The-Transnational-Rise-of-The-Violent-White-Supremacist-Movement.pdf [https://
perma.cc/H5AG-7D7M]; see also Christchurch Shooting, supra note 1.
See SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 26.
Taylor Lorenz, The Shooter’s Manifesto Was Designed to Troll, ATLANTIC (Mar. 15,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/03/the-shooters-manifes
to-was-designed-to-troll/585058/ [https://perma.cc/S2CZ-D4H4].
See infra Section II.B.
See Tim Arango et al., Minutes Before El Paso Killing, Hate-Filled Manifesto
Appears Online, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/08/03/us/patrick-crusius-el-paso-shooter-manifesto.html [https://perma.cc/BT6
K-E2FN] (“Christchurch has become a rallying cry for extremists the world over.”);
see also SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 18.
Mass Shooting in El Paso: What We Know, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Aug. 4,
2019), https://www.adl.org/blog/mass-shooting-in-el-paso-what-we-know [https://per
ma.cc/TP7X-LQAP] [hereinafter Mass Shooting in El Paso] (“This makes the El Paso
shooting the deadliest white supremacist attack in the U.S. in more than 50 years[.]”).
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El Paso, Texas.8 This attack claimed the lives of twenty-two
individuals, left twenty-six wounded, and forced countless others to
bear witness to yet another violent act committed because of racial
animus.9 These were not random acts of violence by disturbed
individuals; they were calculated acts of terrorism.10
Prior to the El Paso attack, Crusius posted a manifesto to the online
forum, 8chan, where like-minded individuals go to share and
promote extreme right wing ideologies.11 This platform not only
hosted Crusius’s manifesto, but was also the source of his
radicalization, taking the process full circle.12 Dissemination of
violent extremist ideas on unmoderated online forums has fostered a
movement of self-radicalization, resulting in a number of mass
shootings across the U.S.13 Current legislation makes it nearly
impossible for the Government to control what is posted and shared
online;14 however, at the request of policymakers and the public, a
8.
9.
10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

Vanessa Romo, El Paso Walmart Shooting Suspect Pleads Not Guilty, NPR (Oct. 10,
2019, 4:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/10/769013051/el-paso-walmart-shoot
ing-suspect-pleads-not-guilty [https://perma.cc/N7MC-Q9SG].
See id.
Compare Sam Levin, ‘It’s a Small Group of People’: Trump Again Denies White
Nationalism Is Rising Threat, GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2019, 8:53 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/15/donald-trump-denies-white-nationalismthreat-new-zealand [https://perma.cc/BY9Y-7XJR] (quoting President Trump who,
when asked whether he believed white nationalism is on its way to becoming an
increasingly large threat, characterized the problem as “a small group of people that
have very, very serious problems.”), with SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 8 (“[W]hite
supremacist extremists . . . pose a clear terrorist threat to the United States.”).
See Mass Shooting in El Paso, supra note 7; see also Patrick Lucas Austin, What Is
8chan, and How Is it Related to this Weekend’s Shootings? Here’s What to Know,
TIME (Aug. 5, 2019, 2:28 PM), https://time.com/5644314/8chan-shootings/ [https://
perma.cc/RZ3T-KAVA].
See Drew Harwell, Three Mass Shootings This Year Began with a Hateful Screed on
8chan. Its Founder Calls It a Terrorist Refuge in Plain Sight., WASH. POST (Aug. 4,
2019, 9:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/04/three-mass
-shootings-this-year-began-with-hateful-screed-chan-its-founder-calls-it-terroristrefuge-plain-sight/ [https://perma.cc/795P-8GS2].
See SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 6; see also U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, PREVENTING
VIOLENT EXTREMISM THROUGH PROMOTING INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT, TOLERANCE
AND RESPECT FOR DIVERSITY 12 (2016), https://www.undp.org/content/dam/
norway/undp-ogc/documents/Discussion%20Paper%20-%20Preventing%20Violent%
20Extremism%20by%20Promoting%20Inclusive%20%20Development.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3L88-LSNK] (“The killing of 77 young people in Norway in 2011 and the
murder of nine worshippers at a church in South Carolina in 2015 both originated
from the same hate-filled ideology.”).
See Steven Beale, Comment, Online Terrorist Speech, Direct Government
Regulation, and the Communications Decency Act, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 333,
334–35 (2018).
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select few online service providers are attempting to curb the spread
of violent extremism through moderation of social media platforms.15
While these efforts are well-intentioned, the violent acts seen across
the nation in recent years have risen to the level of terrorism and
should be treated as such.16 White supremacist extremism poses a
complex transnational problem, and the threat requires a composite
solution.17 Current terrorism legislation needs to be reformed, and
tools that have proven effective in fighting foreign terrorist threats
must be implemented on the domestic stage.18
Part II of this Comment describes the largest threat of violence
facing the U.S.—domestic terrorism—and explores how the free flow
of hate-speech and violent content online has created a global
problem.19 Part III highlights some of the limitations government
agencies are facing under current U.S. terrorism law in their attempt
to thwart acts of domestic terrorism and reprimand individuals whose
heinous crimes rise to the level of terrorism.20 Part IV explores
crucial avenues to equip government entities with the appropriate
resources to prevent acts of terrorism before they occur and to
adequately punish those who manage to go undetected and carry such
plans to completion.21 Part V concludes by summarizing the next
steps that must be taken by policymakers if the Government hopes to
attain the same level of success it has achieved in containing foreign
threats.22
II. THE EVOLVING THREAT OF TERRORISM
A. The Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism
The word “terrorism” has been closely associated with foreign
threats.23 This is due to the lasting impact and high-level of media
coverage of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the threat of ISIS in

15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Daphne Keller, Facebook Restricts Speech by Popular Demand, ATLANTIC (Sept.
22, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/facebook-restricts-freespeech-popular-demand/598462/ [https://perma.cc/LD74-BHUK].
See SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 8 (“From Pittsburgh to Poway and Charleston to El
Paso, white supremacist extremists (WSEs) pose a clear terrorist threat to the United
States.”).
See id. at 6–7.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Par IV.
See infra Part V.
SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 41.
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more recent years.24 While jihadist groups and other foreign terrorist
entities remain a threat, domestic terrorism committed by extreme
right groups has proven much more lethal in recent years.25
According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), a prominent antihate organization, the term “extreme right” refers to “the white
supremacist movement, including its various sub[-]movements, such
as neo-Nazis, racist skinheads, and the alt right, among others.”26
Extreme right, “far-right extremism,” and “white supremacy
extremism” are terms often used interchangeably to describe various
extremist ideologies and racial theories with foundations that stem
from the idea of white supremacy.27 A 2017 study conducted by the
ADL shows that between September 12, 2001 and December 31,
2016, far-right extremists were responsible for seventy-three percent
of all violent extremist attacks in the U.S., compared to the twentyseven percent credited to radical Islamist violence.28 In 2018, the
ADL conducted another study which showed that domestic Islamic
extremists were responsible for only two percent of the total number
of extremist related deaths that year, while the remaining ninety-eight
percent involved far-right extremists.29
In 2019, Congress recognized that “[w]hite supremacists and other
far-right-wing extremists are the most significant domestic terrorism
threat facing the United States.”30 Violence in the name of white
supremacy is, however, not simply a domestic problem affecting only
the U.S.; rather, far-right extremism is a transnational problem.31
Attacks have occurred all over the world, from Norway to New
Zealand, and Canada to the United Kingdom.32 The act of terrorism
in Christchurch, New Zealand, discussed in Part I supra, and the
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.

See id. at 28; Alexander Conley, Note, Obscene Terrorism: Can the First
Amendment’s Obscenity Framework Be Applied to Terrorist Speech?, 51 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 345, 357 (2017).
SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 8–10.
Extreme Right / Radical Right / Far Right, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, https://www.
adl.org/resources/glossary-terms/extreme-right-radical-right-far-right [https://perma.
cc/8ZKS-YZZ5] (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).
See id.
SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 9–10.
See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, A REPORT FROM THE CENTER ON EXTREMISM:
MURDER AND EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2018 13 (2019), https://www.adl
.org/media/12480/download [https://perma.cc/23GP-QEC9]. Seventy-eight percent of
all extremist related murders in 2018 were committed by individuals associated with
white supremacist groups. Id.
Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act, S. 894, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019).
See SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 6, 11.
See id. at 31.
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2011 attacks carried out by Anders Breivik in Oslo and Utoya
Norway—with a total death count of sixty-nine—are believed to be
among the most “high-profile” and influential far-right extremist
attacks to date.33 These attacks, although taking place entirely
outside of the U.S., have had a tremendous impact on the U.S.,
causing an influx of extremist violence in recent years.34 In the
aftermath of the aforementioned acts of terrorism, lone actors across
the country have taken their advocacy of white supremacy to another
level, initiating a violent movement.35 Some examples include the
mass shooting of parishioners at a church in Charleston, South
Carolina, discussed infra Section III.B., the attack on members
congregating at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, discussed infra Section III.B., and the shooting at a
Walmart in El Paso, Texas, discussed supra Part I.36 These are only
a small fraction of the domestic terrorist attacks that have plagued the
U.S. following the 2011 terrorist attack in Norway.37
B. Online Radicalization
In his sixteen-thousand-word manifesto, Brenton Tarrant wrote:
“From where did you receive/research/develop your beliefs? . . . The
internet, of course. You will not find the truth anywhere else.”38 This
statement breathes life into former FBI agent Ali Soufan’s statement
that “social media has exacerbated the issue [of domestic terrorism]
by helping connect transnational nodes of like-minded individuals
and groups.”39 Social media has become a prominent avenue for
violent far-right extremists to share their ideas, spread their causes,
and radicalize others.40 White supremacists all over the world have
taken notice of the unique internet laws in the U.S. and exploited its
lenient policies to promote their extremist ideologies.41
An
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

39.
40.
41.

Id. at 11, 26–27.
See id. at 41.
See id.
See id. at 8; see infra notes 69–74 and accompanying text; see infra notes 77–80 and
accompanying text; see supra notes 6–12 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE , supra note 29, at 13.
Lizzie Dearden, New Zealand Attack: How Nonsensical White Genocide Conspiracy
Theory Cited by Alleged Gunman Is Spreading Poison Around the World,
INDEPENDENT (Mar. 16, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world
/australasia/new-zealand-christchurch-mosque-attack-white-genocide-conspiracy-theo
ry-a8824671.html [https://perma.cc/L32P-6ARM].
SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 41.
Id. at 17.
See, e.g., Austin, supra note 11 (discussing 8chan as an example of a site that has
taken advantage of the lax internet laws in the U.S.).
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unmoderated online forum, 8chan, has been ground zero for white
supremacist violence in recent years.42 Three terrorist attacks in
2019 alone—the shooting in Christchurch, New Zealand, the Poway
Synagogue shooting in California, and the El Paso shooting—have
been linked to 8chan.43 The individuals responsible for each of these
attacks posted lengthy manifestos to 8chan before committing these
acts of violence.44 Anonymous users on the website not only
celebrated the acts of violence but also spread the content across the
Internet and promoted the attackers’ messages.45 The radicalization
process comes full circle with the help of unmoderated websites such
as 8chan.46 In his manifesto, posted to 8chan just nineteen minutes
before the attack ensued, the El Paso shooter gave credit to the
Christchurch shooter for inspiring him to take action.47 Within the
confines of his manifesto, Crusius explored his white supremacist
ideals and motivations, while also expressing the importance of
publicity for the issue, stating: “[D]o your part and spread this
brothers!”48 While the Poway shooter relied heavily on a similar
website, Gab, to promote his cause and spread awareness of his
hateful acts, he also posted on 8chan stating: “[W]hat I’ve learned
here is priceless. It’s been an honor.”49 The increased use of social
media to radicalize individuals in all corners of the world has created
a decentralized threat which may be more difficult for the
Government to detect and control.50

42.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.

See Sean Keane & Oscar Gonzalez, 8chan’s Rebranded 8kun Site Goes Offline Days
After Launch, CNET (Nov. 25, 2019, 12:47 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/8chanrebranded-8kun-site-taken-offline-days-after-launch/ [https://perma.cc/48F7-9HSD].
Following its temporary shutdown as a result of the El Paso shooting and its role in
that violent attack, 8chan re-entered the online sphere on under a new name: 8kun. Id.
The website was subsequently shut down again two days later. Id.
Harwell, supra note 12.
Id.; SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 18.
Harwell, supra note 12.
See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
See Harwell, supra note 12; see Arango et al., supra note 6.
Harwell, supra note 12; see Austin, supra note 11.
See Keegan Hankes et al., Shooting at Poway Synagogue Underscores Link Between
Internet Radicalization and Violence, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Apr. 28, 2019), https://
www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2019/04/28/shooting-poway-synagogue-underscores-li
nk-between-internet-radicalization-and-violence [https://perma.cc/6LW8-43CH]; see
also Harwell, supra note 12; see generally Kevin Roose, On Gab, an ExtremistFriendly Site, Pittsburgh Shooting Suspect Aired His Hatred in Full, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/us/gab-robert-bowers-pittsburgh-syn
agogue-shootings.html [https://perma.cc/4A6F-QF9E].
See SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 35–36.
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III. LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENT ACTION
A. Communications Decency Act
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) is one factor creating a
substantial impediment to government action where online
radicalization is concerned.51 The CDA was enacted as part of the
Telecommunications Act in 1996 to limit publisher liability in light
of the perceived differences between the Internet and other
mediums.52 Section 230 of the CDA, perhaps the most important
piece of internet legislation, states in relevant part: “No provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”53 This section shields computer
service providers from liability when lawsuits arise out of content
generated by users on the host’s website.54 The types of publishing
activity intended to fall under this protection include “monitoring,
reviewing, and editing content.”55 In Fields v. Twitter, the court
refused a broad interpretation of Section 230, stating that,
“[s]hielding interactive computer service providers from publisher
liability for all content encourages these companies to create
‘platform[s] . . . allow[ing] for the freedom of expression [of]
hundreds of millions of people around the world,’ . . . just as the
CDA intended.”56
This legislation has been instrumental in expanding social media
platforms and in making the Internet what it is today.57 While this
section of the CDA has been credited for its role in the progression of
the online world, it also has tremendous pitfalls.58 Under the CDA,
51.
52.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

58.

See Beale, supra note 14, at 338.
See Adi Robertson, Why the Internet’s Most Important Law Exists and How People
Are Still Getting It Wrong, VERGE (June 21, 2019, 1:02 PM), https://www.the
verge.com/2019/6/21/18700605/section-230-internet-law-twenty-six-words-that-creat
ed-the-internet-jeff-kosseff-interview [https://perma.cc/VMC5-7UNS].
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
See Robertson, supra note 52.
Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 881 F.3d
739 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1129 (emphasis added).
See Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 [https://perma.cc/J8D3-DH6B] (last visited Dec.
16, 2020) [hereinafter Section 230] (“This legal and policy framework has allowed for
YouTube and Vimeo users to upload their own videos, Amazon and Yelp to offer
countless user reviews, craigslist to host classified ads, and Facebook and Twitter to
offer social networking to hundreds of millions of Internet users.”).
See id.; see Robertson, supra note 52.

2021]

Terrorism: An Evolving Threat

343

Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are seldom held liable for
inadequate or a complete lack of monitoring and editing
mechanisms.59 ISPs are therefore not incentivized to create systems
to monitor and prevent the spread of hateful or violent speech.60
Although some of the largest social media platforms—e.g., Facebook
and Twitter—took steps to prevent the spread of hateful and violent
content, their measures have only driven extremists to underground,
unmoderated platforms.61 As a result, online platforms such as
8chan, 4chan, Gab, the Daily Stormer, and many others have become
cesspools for violence and hatred, leaving it entirely in the hands of
ISPs to put an end to underground communities of hate speech.62
B. Domestic Terrorism Under Current Law
Current federal law is also grossly inadequate to address the
growing concerns surrounding violence by the extreme right.63 Title
18 of the U.S. Code defines acts of domestic terrorism as:
[A]ctivities that involve acts dangerous to human life that
are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of
any State; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population; to influence the policy of a government
by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.64
While domestic terrorism is explicitly defined under federal law, it is
not a federal crime.65 Therefore, acts of violence that fall within the
59.

60.
61.
62.
63.

64.
65.

See, e.g., Fields, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1129; Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354,
1356 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2008);
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1162–63 (9th Cir. 2008).
See Beale, supra note 14, at 344.
See Roose, supra note 49.
See Keller, supra note 15; see SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 6.
See Barbara McQuade, Proposed Bills Would Help Combat Domestics Terrorism,
LAWFARE (Aug. 20, 2019, 8:49 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/proposed-billswould-help-combat-domestic-terrorism [https://perma.cc/B322-SJFW].
18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).
Kevin Johnson & Kristine Phillips, After Massacres and Thwarted Plots, Federal
Authorities Confront Limits in Fighting Domestic Terrorism, USA TODAY (Sept. 10,
2019, 3:25 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/09/10/feds-conf
ront-limits-domestic-terror-laws-new-plots-appear/1953415001/ [https://perma.cc/HH
8L-FR2A].
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statutory definition of domestic terrorism cannot be treated as federal
crimes.66 Prosecutors across the country are instead tasked with
employing various state and federal charges to prosecute those who
commit acts of domestic terrorism.67 This has proven to be a
challenge, often delivering unsatisfying results.68
In 2015, Dylann Roof committed one of the most notable acts of
domestic terrorism in recent history.69 The twenty-one-year-old
white supremacist killed nine African-American parishioners at a
church in Charleston, South Carolina.70 Like many other white
supremacist extremists, Roof posted a manifesto sharing his ideology
and the reasoning behind his attack.71 In his proclamation, Roof
“blamed blacks for ‘raping our women’ and taking over ‘our
country.’”72 Roof’s manifesto and his decision to leave only one
witness behind to testify to the events of that day are sufficient
considerations to establish that his actions were dangerous to human
life and “appear[ed] to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population.”73 Although his actions fell within the statutory
definition of domestic terrorism, prosecutors were only able to charge
Roof with federal hate crimes.74 This attack drew attention to the
inadequate terrorism laws in place in the U.S. and emphasized the
need for reconstruction.75
Despite the apparent need for reform, federal terrorism laws remain
unchanged.76 On October 27, 2018, Robert Bowers entered the Tree
of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania where he killed eleven

66.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Trevor Aaronson, Terrorism’s Double Standard: Violent Far-Right Extremists Are
Rarely Prosecuted as Terrorists, INTERCEPT (Mar. 23, 2019, 8:34 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/03/23/domestic-terrorism-fbi-prosecutions/ [https://per
ma.cc/572L-MHPQ].
Id.; see Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and
“International” Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2019).
Aaronson, supra note 66.
See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 29, at 25 (listing Dylann Roof’s attack as
one of the ten deadliest acts of violence by domestic extremists over the past six
decades).
Jesse J. Norris, Why Dylann Roof Is a Terrorist Under Federal Law, and Why It
Matters, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 260 (2017).
See id. at 274.
Id.
Id. (“Any murder motivated by a racist ideology is inherently intimidating to the hated
population, and any attacker committing such murder clearly intends for that
intimidation to occur.”); see 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).
See Norris, supra note 70, at 273.
See id. at 259.
See generally Aaronson, supra note 66.
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members congregating for religious services.77 Bowers’s actions can
be traced to an anti-Semitic ideology, as his social media postings
reflect a hatred for practicing Jews.78 The attack on the Tree of Life
Synagogue was presumably attributed to Bowers’s hatred of Jewish
people, making his attack an act of domestic terrorism.79 Even
though his actions rose to the level of terrorism, Bowers was only
indicted on charges of murder, discharging a firearm, and federal hate
crimes.80
Individuals detained before committing an act of terrorism prove
even more difficult to prosecute.81 For example, prosecutors
grappled with the insufficient resources at their disposal when
indicting Christopher Hasson on weapons and drug-related charges in
early 2019.82 Hasson purchased “15 guns, silencers, [and] 1,000
rounds of ammunition” in preparation for the attack the Government
believes he planned to commit against prominent politicians and
media journalists in the name of white supremacy.83 Despite
recognizing Hasson as a domestic terrorist, the Government was
unable to prosecute him as such due to the continued absence of
legislation making domestic terrorism a federal crime.84 Government
entities are better equipped to deal with foreign threats in this context
because attempt, conspiracy, and material support statutes allow them
to act before heinous crimes involving foreign terrorist organizations
(FTOs) are actually committed.85 Similar provisions do not exist
where domestic threats are concerned, making it difficult for

77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

83.

84.
85.

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Additional Charges Filed in Tree of Life
Synagogue Shooting (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/additional-cha
rges-filed-tree-life-synagogue-shooting [https://perma.cc/MSP8-X4FC] [hereinafter
Tree of Life Synagogue Shooting].
Id. (“[A] statement on his profile expressed the belief that ‘[J]ews are the children of
[S]atan.’”).
See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).
See Tree of Life Synagogue Shooting, supra note 77.
See, e.g., Motion for Detention Pending Trial at 1, United States v. Hasson, No. GLS19-63 (D. Md. Feb. 19, 2019).
Id. In its Motion for Detention Pending Trial, the Government, claiming that Hasson
is in fact a domestic terrorist, impliedly stated that it was grasping at straws to convict
a terrorist for his attempted crimes. Id.
Tom Jackman, Coast Guard Lieutenant Accused of Plotting Mass Attack Pleads
Guilty to Gun, Drug Charges, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2019, 4:01 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/coast-guard-lieutenant-accused-of-plott
ing-mass-attack-pleads-guilty-to-gun-drug-charges/2019/10/03/58c0fbf8-e553-11e9b403-f738899982d2_story.html [https://perma.cc/RN4Z-2Y5Y].
See Motion for Detention Pending Trial, supra note 81, at 1.
See McQuade, supra note 63; see 18 U.S.C. § 2332b; see also § 2339B(a)–(e).
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authorities to intervene and prosecute individuals who have not yet
carried out their intended crimes.86
Due to the Government’s limited resources, the FBI has primarily
relied on tips from the public in thwarting plots of domestic
terrorism.87 In the months following the El Paso shooting, police
detained a number of individuals reported by members of the public
for expressing intentions to commit acts of mass violence.88 The
public remaining vigilant and on high alert in the wake of a series of
mass shootings prevented these individuals from carrying out what
could have been horrific acts of domestic terrorism.89 In November
of 2019, the Deputy Assistant Director for the Counterterrorism
Division of the FBI spoke in Washington, D.C. about the FBI’s
current counterterrorism strategies.90 During this lecture, he stated
that “tips from the public will be one [of] the most powerful tools we
have in detecting and preventing attacks.”91
This statement
emphasizes the lack of resources at the Government’s disposal in
combatting domestic terrorism.92
While the public was instrumental in thwarting a few individuals
who may have potentially carried out acts of mass violence, this is
not a sufficient long-term solution.93 For example, the public
informed the FBI of a potential attack on the Poway Synagogue in
California five minutes before the shooting occurred.94 This brief
timespan did not offer officials enough time to identify the alleged
shooter and take the proper course of action to detain him before the
86.

87.
88.

89.
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.

See Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2019, S. 894, 116th Cong. (2019)
(introducing agency infrastructure, reporting standards, and funding to address
growing concern of domestic terrorism).
Johnson & Phillips, supra note 65.
Id. (“A Florida man allegedly vows to ‘break a world record’ for mass shooting
casualties; a disgruntled hotel cook in California threatens to transform a Marriott
lobby into a killing field; a Jewish community center in Ohio is the target in a
suspected shooting plot.”).
See id.
Matthew Alcoke, Deputy Assistant Dir., Counterterrorism Div., Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, Remarks at Washington Inst. for Near East Pol’y Counterterrorism
Lecture Series: The Evolving and Persistent Terrorism Threat to the Homeland (Nov.
19, 2019), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-evolving-and-persistent-terrorismthreat-to-the-homeland-111919 [https://perma.cc/WVC4-X9ZH].
Id.
See id.
See Johnson & Phillips, supra note 65.
See Julia Reinstein, Someone Found the Poway Synagogue Shooter’s Manifesto and
Called the FBI Minutes Before the Attack Began, BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 29, 2019,
12:05 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/juliareinstein/8chan-poway-synag
ogue-shooter-manifesto-fbi [https://perma.cc/9Q6G-AH5K].
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attack came to fruition.95 If the past is any indication of what is to be
expected in the future, the public will not have enough time to alert
FBI officials to such attacks before they are carried out.96 Another
concern involves the sheer number of tips received by officials.97
FBI reports show that “[d]uring the first week of August, the period
covering the El Paso and Dayton shootings . . . 38,000 tips had
streamed into its National Threat Operations Center[.]”98
IV. EXPANDING UNITED STATES TERRORISM LAWS
A. Domestic Terrorism as a Federal Crime
Following a number of domestic terrorist attacks that plagued the
U.S. in 2018, a series of bills were introduced in both the House and
Senate to address the rising concern of domestic terrorism.99 In
March 2019, Senator Richard Durbin introduced the Domestic
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2019, the goal of which was to provide
government entities with the necessary resources to fight domestic
terrorism.100 This bill did not advocate immediate amendments to
U.S. terrorism laws, but instead suggested that government entities,
including the FBI and Department of Justice, receive authorization to
investigate organizations perceived as domestic threats.101 In August
2019, Democratic Representative Adam Schiff introduced another

95.
96.

See id.
See id.; see also Harwell, supra note 12 (discussing El Paso shooter’s manifesto
posted to 8chan minutes before the attack began); see also Christchurch Shooting,
supra note 1 (discussing Christchurch shooter’s livestream video posted moments
before opening fire).
97. See Johnson & Phillips, supra note 65.
98. Id.
99. See generally ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 29, at 10, 13–15, 23–24 (“[I]n
2018, there were five shooting sprees collectively responsible for 38 deaths and 33
non-fatal casualties.”); see also Press Release, Rep. Adam Schiff, Chairman, House
Permanent Select Comm. on Intel., Schiff Introduces Legislation to Create a Federal
Domestic Terrorism Crime (Aug. 16, 2019), https://schiff.house.gov/news/pressreleases/schiff-introduces-legislation-to-create-a-federal-domestic-terrorism-crime
[https://perma.cc/EY8A-U4XR].
100. See Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2019, S. 894, 116th Cong. (2019) (the Act
is designed “[t]o authorize dedicated domestic terrorism offices within the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation to analyze and monitor domestic terrorist activity and require the
Federal Government to take steps to prevent domestic terrorism.”).
101. Id. at §§ 4(a)(2)–(3), 6(a), 7–8.
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bill titled Confronting the Threat of Domestic Terrorism Act.102 This
bill proposed a much-needed amendment to Title 18 of the U.S.
Code, which, if implemented, would make domestic terrorism a
federal crime.103 As discussed, domestic terrorism is already defined
under Title 18 of the U.S. Code and largely mirrors the statutory
definition of international terrorism.104 However, one significant
difference is that international terrorism is a federal crime under
Section 2332b, while no analogous provision currently exists
recognizing domestic terrorism as a federal crime.105
The bill introduced by Representative Schiff also proposed an
amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which would make it a federal
crime to provide material support or resources in furtherance of an
act of domestic terrorism.106 “Material support” in this context
includes:
[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, or service, including
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities,
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or
assistance,
safehouses,
false
documentation
or
identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.107
Under current federal law, this provision can only be used to
prosecute individuals suspected of providing material support to

102. Confronting the Threat of Domestic Terrorism Act, H.R. 4192, 116th Cong. § 1
(2019); see McQuade, supra note 63. A strikingly similar bill was introduced by
Republican Senator Martha McSally. McQuade, supra note 63.
103. Compare H.R. 4192 (proposing the inclusion of “Acts of Terrorism Occurring in the
Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States” under § 2332 of the U.S.C.), with 18
U.S.C. § 2332b (limiting criminal penalties for terrorist acts to crimes affecting
commerce, crimes committed against the U.S. Government, and crimes committed in
U.S. waters).
104. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). The
only notable difference between the statutory definitions is that acts of domestic
terrorism must “occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States”
while international terrorism must “occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States[.]” Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (defining international
terrorism) (emphasis added), with § 2331(5) (defining domestic terrorism) (emphasis
added).
105. See Johnson & Phillips, supra note 65.
106. See H.R. 4192 § 2.
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).
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international terrorists.108 However, the Government predominantly
relies on Section 2339B in cases involving international terrorism.109
Both provisions proscribe anyone from providing material support or
resources: Section 2339A prohibits providing such support to aid acts
of terrorism,110 while Section 2339B prohibits the same conduct in
support of FTOs.111 Creating an analogous provision under Section
2339B to prohibit individuals from providing material support to
domestic terrorist organizations (DTOs) is not feasible under current
law, as the Government has yet to compile and make publicly
available a list of organizations classified as domestic threats.112 In
relying on Section 2339A to prevent material support in cases
involving domestic terrorism, Representative Schiff attempts to
remedy the gap in legislation without the need for a designated DTO
list.113
B. Addressing the Concerns
The amendment to Section 2339A114 is a primary aspect of
Representative Schiff’s proposed bill and suggested changes to
terrorism legislation in general, which has received significant
criticism.115 One explanation for this reaction is the perceived
overuse and abuse of Section 2339B, which has been used to secure
convictions of U.S. citizens allegedly involved in furthering the
objectives of FTOs.116 The material support provisions have been
108. Compare H.R. 4192 § 2 (proposing the inclusion of “[a]cts of terrorism occurring in
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States” under § 2339A(a)), with 18 U.S.C. §
2339A(a).
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
110. § 2339A.
111. § 2339B.
112. See JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44921, DOMESTIC TERRORISM: AN
OVERVIEW 57–58 (2017).
113. See H.R. 4192 § 2.
114. See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.
115. Matt Ford, The Danger of a Domestic Terrorism Law, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 15,
2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/154785/danger-domestic-terrorism-law [https:
//perma.cc/Q69F-BZUZ].
116. See id.; see also Sinnar, supra note 67, at 1355–56. Tarek Mahanna’s case provides
an example. Ford, supra note 115.
Federal prosecutors brought material-support charges against
the Pennsylvania-born man in 2009 for providing assistance to Al
Qaeda. That assistance, according to prosecutors, came in the
form of translating publicly available Al Qaeda documents into
English. . . . He received a 17-and-a-half year prison sentence in
2012.
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subject to scrutiny because such laws encroach on constitutionally
protected rights¾particularly the right to free speech and
association.117 First Amendment concerns drive the immense
reservation in amending terrorism statutes to criminalize acts of
domestic terrorism.118 For example, the overreaching effects of
material support statutes in cases involving international terrorism
raise concerns that, if applied to domestic terrorism, constitutionally
protected conduct (e.g., sharing online memes posted by white
supremacist groups, forwarding manifestos, or linking and sharing
copies of books inspiring such organizations) will subject U.S.
citizens to severe criminal penalties.119 Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project is a frequently cited case exemplifying the overreaching
effects of the material support provisions.120 In that case, domestic
organizations and U.S. citizens challenged Section 2339B, claiming
that the material support provision—which prohibited the
organizations from providing lawful assistance to designated FTOs—
violated their constitutional right to free speech and association.121
The objective of these individuals and organizations was to provide
lawful support to the humanitarian and political sectors of two FTOs,
not to support the organizations’ terrorist activities.122 The Supreme
Court held that Section 2339B is to be interpreted as prohibiting U.S.
citizens from providing material support or resources to organizations
when the person or group providing such support knows the
organization is a designated FTO or has connections to terrorism; it
did not, however, choose to extend the mens rea requirement to the
intent behind providing material support to FTOs.123 Therefore, the
individuals and organization challenging the constitutionality of
Section 2339B were prohibited from providing any kind of material
support or resources to the FTOs, despite the fact that their intentions
While Mahanna expressed verbal support for Osama bin
Laden’s cause at times, the ACLU noted in 2012 that prosecutors
offered no evidence that he was in communication with Al Qaeda
or acted at the organization’s behest. His conviction rested on the
theory that he had advanced their cause simply by translating their
texts.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
See Sinnar, supra note 67, at 1367–68; see also Ford, supra note 115.
See Sinnar, supra note 67, at 1367.
See Ford, supra note 115.
See generally 561 U.S. 1 (2010); see Sinnar, supra note 67, at 1368.
Holder, 561 U.S. at 7–8.
Id. at 10.
See id. at 16–17.
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were not to further the unlawful objectives of the organizations.124
The Court recognized that the conduct in question involved speech,
but clarified that speech is not protected in all instances, specifically
in the context of terrorism.125
In upholding the constitutionality of Section 2339B, even when
free speech is limited by government action, the Supreme Court held
that material support “frees up other resources within the
organization that may be put to violent ends[,] . . . [and] lend[s]
legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups—legitimacy that makes it easier
for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds—
all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.”126 Although this
rationale was applied in the context of international terrorism, the
same concerns can and should be echoed when support is given to
domestic organizations.127 The Court also referenced diplomacy
reasons for allowing Section 2339B to prohibit otherwise protected
speech.128 By allowing U.S. citizens to provide support to FTOs that
other countries are vigorously fighting to dismantle, the U.S. would
impair its relationships with those countries.129 This concern is
overlooked in terms of domestic terrorism because domestic
organizations are perceived as being a threat only to the U.S.;130
however, white supremacist groups—the primary domestic threat—
operate in various cells in countries all over the world and therefore
present an equally applicable reason for extending material support
provisions in cases of domestic terrorism.131 A few countries, such
as Canada and the United Kingdom, have already taken steps to
combat terrorism linked to white supremacist ideologies.132 If the
U.S. continues to allow material support to be given freely to these
organizations, it could eventually be perceived as hindering the
efforts taken by other countries.133 This is especially true considering
Section 230 of the CDA provides terrorists worldwide access to
platforms which enable these organizations to spread their message,
124.
125.
126.
127.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 14–17.
See id. at 27–29.
Id. at 30.
Cf. Sinnar, supra note 67, at 1333, 1336–37, 1371 (discussing how domestic terrorist
threats are handled differently by the Government and law enforcement as compared
to international terrorist threats, even though domestic terrorism poses a more direct
threat to Americans).
Holder, 561 U.S. at 32.
Id. at 32–33.
See Sinnar, supra note 67, at 1371.
See supra Section II.A.
See SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 12.
See id.

352

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

radicalize, and mobilize.134 Having upheld legislation that allows the
threat of terrorism to evolve and grow, the U.S. must begin taking
steps to combat the spread of white supremacist violence.135
Amending Title 18 to include a material support charge applicable
to those acting in furtherance of domestic terrorism will not only
address the diplomacy concerns, but will also be instrumental in
detecting and preventing the largest domestic threat confronting the
U.S. government: the lone wolf actor.136 Each of the domestic
terrorist attacks described thus far was carried out by individuals
characterized as lone wolf actors.137 “[T]errorist lone actors (lone
wolves) . . . generally operate autonomously and in secret, all the
while drawing ideological sustenance—not direction—from
propagandists operating in the free market of ideas.”138 Lone actors
have proven to be a great challenge for law enforcement as they lack
official membership in or in connection with specific
organizations.139 Another reason for this challenge is that under the
current federal structure, “[u]p until the moment the trigger is pulled,
the quintessential, and typical, lone wolf will not have violated any
laws.”140 This gap in legislation is precisely why prominent white
supremacist leaders have promoted leaderless resistance over the
years.141 Not only are lone actors often able to go undetected, but

134. See Section 230, supra note 57 (“The legal protections provided by CDA 230 are
unique to U.S. law[] . . . [which] makes the U.S. a safe haven for websites that want to
provide a platform for controversial or political speech and a legal environment
favorable to free expression.”).
135. See infra text accompanying notes 161–66.
136. See generally Terrorism, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism [https://
perma.cc/2UL7-XZ7M] (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).
137. See supra Sections II.A., III.B.
138. BJELOPERA, supra note 112, at 2.
139. See Terrorism, supra note 136.
140. Beau D. Barnes, Note, Confronting the One-Man Wolf Pack: Adapting Law
Enforcement and Prosecution Responses to the Threat of Lone Wolf Terrorism, 92
B.U. L. REV. 1613, 1654 (2012).
141. Jared Keller, There Are No Lone Wolves, PAC. STANDARD (May 22, 2018), https://
psmag.com/news/there-are-no-lone-wolves [https://perma.cc/2EQU-U9UL]. “After
several high-profile crimes committed by organized white supremacist groups during
the ‘70s and ‘80s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had started getting tough on
‘coordinated forms of militancy,’ . . . Decentralized ‘lone wolves’ allowed white
supremacists to to [sic] thwart conspiracy statutes. And it worked.” Id. “When
hundreds of ‘lone wolves’ are reading the same websites, talking to each other,
consuming the same stories, picking up easily accessible weapons, and killing the
same targets, they have become a pack.” Id. (quoting David M. Perry, How White
American Terrorists Are Radicalized, PAC. STANDARD (Mar. 26, 2018), https://ps
mag.com/social-justice/how-white-american-terrorists-are-radicalized).
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once reprimanded, the organization as a whole is not negatively
impacted.142
Although the threat of white supremacy is one that should be
approached with as much vigor and force as that which is used in the
war against international terrorism, it must be handled in the least
restrictive way possible.143 This requires a balancing of civil liberties
and national security to determine what lengths must be taken in
order to effectively combat domestic terrorism.144 If implemented
correctly, an amendment to Section 2339A would allow government
entities to thwart acts of violence before they occur, and would give
prosecutors the ability to charge those involved in terrorist conduct to
the fullest extent while still limiting the suppression of free speech.145
Justice Breyer addressed this issue in his dissenting opinion in
Holder.146 Justice Breyer stated that it is entirely possible to prevent
the criminalization of constitutionally protected speech under Section
2339B.147 This simply calls for an interpretation which would attach
the mens rea requirement to all subsequent elements of the statute, a
customary practice for interpreting criminal statutes.148 The statute
prohibits U.S. citizens from “knowingly provid[ing] material support
or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”149 By requiring
those providing material support to not only have knowledge that the
organization is an FTO, as the majority suggested, but also to have
knowledge that the material support would further the unlawful
objectives of the organization or have a strong likelihood of doing so,
Justice Breyer believed First Amendment concerns would be
limited.150 This interpretation of the material support statute provides
that criminal liability for constitutionally protected speech will attach
only when the individual intends such speech to further the unlawful
objectives of a designated terrorist organization, or when the
individual knows there is a strong possibility that it will have that
effect.151
This, in Justice Breyer’s opinion, would prevent
142. See id.
143. See Kenneth Lasson, Incitement in the Mosques: Testing the Limits of Free Speech
and Religious Liberty, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 72–73 (2005) (“Individual liberty
should be protected to the greatest extent possible, but not at the sacrifice of national
security.”).
144. See id.
145. See McQuade, supra note 63; see also infra notes 146–53 and accompanying text.
146. See Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 41 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 56.
148. See id. at 57.
149. Id.; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
150. Holder, 561 U.S. at 53.
151. Id. at 56–57.
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constitutionally protected speech from being criminalized.152 By
adopting this interpretation, or rather, by amending Sections 2339A
and 2339B to reflect this interpretation, the Government may be able
to address the public’s concerns and prevent an overreaching
encroachment on lawful, protected speech.153
V. CONCLUSION
Domestic terrorism has become one of the largest threats facing the
U.S., even surpassing that of foreign terrorism.154 The U.S. is not
equipped to deal with the evolving threat of terrorism, which is
evidenced by the series of domestic attacks in previous years by
individuals whose acts were driven by white supremacist
ideologies.155 Under current U.S. law, domestic terrorism is not a
federally recognized crime, and no system exists for designating
white supremacist and other extremist groups as DTOs.156 This
significantly limits the Government’s ability to locate and investigate
individuals who may be planning to commit acts of terrorism against
other U.S. citizens.157 The increase in domestic terrorist attacks in
recent years has yet to inspire a significant change in federal law.158
As such, the FBI continues to rely on tips from the public in
identifying possible terrorist threats.159 Weeding out lone actors one
at a time in the hopes of preventing further acts of terrorism displays
a gross underestimation of the severity of the problem.160
White supremacy extremism is a transnational problem,161 which is
exacerbated by U.S. internet legislation allowing extremist groups to
stay connected and recruit individuals from all corners of the world
to join in and sympathize with their cause.162 Lax policies
concerning domestic terrorism not only underestimates the risk to
U.S. citizens but also hinder other countries that have taken steps to

152. See id. (“Where the activity fits into these categories of purposefully or knowingly
supporting terrorist ends, the act of providing material support to a known terrorist
organization bears a close enough relation to terrorist acts that, in my view, it likely
can be prohibited notwithstanding any First Amendment interest.”).
153. See id.
154. See supra Section II.A.
155. See supra Section III.B.
156. See BJELOPERA, supra note 112, at 5–6.
157. See supra Section III.B.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 69–80.
159. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 87–98 and accompanying text.
161. See supra Section II.B.
162. See Section 230, supra note 57.
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mitigate the problem of white supremacy extremism.163 Moving
forward, U.S. terrorism laws need to be reformed to reflect the
growing problem of domestic terrorism facing the U.S.164 These
reforms include, first and foremost, amending 18 U.S.C. § 2332b to
include acts of terrorism occurring within the U.S.165 Additionally,
legislators need to address the First Amendment concerns
surrounding the existing material support statutes and amend Section
2339A to prohibit U.S. citizens from providing material support or
resources in furtherance of acts of domestic terrorism.166 While
legislators must take precautions to limit the encroachment on First
Amendment rights, a degree of restriction on the right to free speech
may be necessary to address the Government’s equally important
interest in providing national security.167 U.S. terrorism law needs to
be restructured to address the evolving threat of terrorism if there is
any hope of suppressing the growing threat of domestic terrorism
plaguing the country.168

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147–53 and accompanying text.
See SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 6–7.
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